We study mechanism design in dynamic quasilinear environments where private information arrives over time and decisions are made over multiple periods. Our first main result is a necessary condition for incentive compatibility that takes the form of an envelope formula for the derivative of an agent's equilibrium expected payoff with respect to his current type. It combines the familiar marginal effect of types on payoffs with novel marginal effects of the current type on future ones that are captured by "impulse response functions." The formula yields an expression for dynamic virtual surplus which is instrumental to the design of optimal mechanisms, and to the study of distortions under such mechanisms. Our second main result gives transfers that satisfy the envelope formula, and establishes a sense in which they are pinned down by the allocation rule ("revenue equivalence"). Our third main result is a characterization of PBE-implementable allocation rules in Markov environments, which yields tractable sufficient conditions that facilitate novel applications. We illustrate the results by applying them to the design of optimal mechanisms for the sale of experience goods ("bandit auctions").
Introduction
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arbitrary time horizon. The model allows for serial correlation of the agents' information and for the dependence of this information on past allocations. For example, it covers as special cases problems such as allocation of private or public goods to agents whose valuations evolve stochastically over time, procedures for selling experience goods to consumers who refine their valuations upon consumption, and multi-period procurement under learning-by-doing. Because of the arbitrary time horizon, the model also accommodates problems where the timing of decisions is a choice variable such as when auctioning off rights for the extraction of a natural resource.
Our main results, Theorems 1-3, provide characterizations of dynamic local and global incentivecompatibility constraints that extend the Myersonian approach to mechanism design with continuous types (Myerson, 1981 ) to dynamic environments. We then apply these results to the design of optimal dynamic mechanisms. We focus on quasilinear environments where the agents' new private information is unidimensional in each period. 1 In order to rule out the possibility of full surplus extractionà la Cremer and McLean (1988) , we assume throughout that this information is independent across agents conditional on the allocations observed by them. In addition to the methodological contribution, our results provide some novel concepts that facilitate a unified view of the existing literature and help to explain what drives distortions in optimal dynamic contracts.
The cornerstone of our analysis is a dynamic envelope theorem, Theorem 1, which, under appropriate regularity conditions, yields a formula for the derivative of an agent's expected equilibrium payoff with respect to his current private information, or type, in any perfect Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism. 2 Similarly to Mirrlees' (1971) first-order approach for static environments, this formula characterizes local incentive-compatibility constraints. It captures the usual direct effect of a change in the current type on the agent's utility as well as a novel indirect effect due to the induced change in the distribution of the agent's future types. The stochastic component of the latter is summarized by impulse response functions that describe how a change in the agent's current type propagates through his type process. Theorem 1 thus identifies the impulse response as the notion of stochastic dependence relevant for mechanism design. Our definition of the impulse response functions and the proof of Theorem 1 make use of the fact that any stochastic process can be constructed from a sequence of independent random variables. This observation was first used in the context of mechanism design by Eső and Szentes (2007) .
The envelope formula of Theorem 1 is independent of transfers, and thus applying it to the initial period yields a dynamic payoff equivalence result that generalizes the revenue equivalence theorem 1 By reinterpreting monetary payments as "utility from monetary payments," all of our results on incentive compatibility trivially extend to non-quasilinear environments where the agents' utility from monetary payments (or, more generally, from some other instrument available to the designer) is independent of their private information and additively separable from their allocation utility. For example, this covers models typically considered in new dynamic public finance or in the managerial compensation literature. 2 This envelope theorem may be useful also in other stochastic dynamic programming problems.
of Myerson (1981) . On the other hand, given any dynamic allocation rule, the envelope formula can be used to construct payments, which satisfy local incentive compatibility constraints at all truthful histories. We show this in Theorem 2, which also provides a sense in which these payments are unique. In particular, in the single-agent case, the net present value of payments for any realized sequence of types for the agent is determined by the allocation rule up to a single scalar. This ex-post payoff equivalence extends to multiple agents under an additional condition (which, for instance, is satisfied if the evolution of types is independent of allocations) to pin down the expected net present value of payments conditional on the agent's own type sequence, where the expectation is over the other agents' type sequences. 3 We then focus on Markov environments in order to characterize global incentive-compatibility constraints. We show in Theorem 3 that an allocation rule is implementable in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if, and only if, it satisfies integral monotonicity. The Markov restriction implies that when this is the case, the allocation rule can be implemented, using payments from Theorem 2, in a strongly truthful equilibrium where the agents report truthfully on and off the equilibrium path.
This allows us to restrict attention to one-shot deviations from truthtelling, and is the reason for our focus on Markov environments. It is instructive to note, however, that even if an agent's current type is unidimensional, his report can affect allocations in multiple periods. Thus the static analog of our problem is one with unidimensional types but multi-dimensional allocations, which explains why the integral-monotonicity condition cannot be simplified without losing necessity. 4 Theorem 3 facilitates formulating sufficient conditions for implementability that are stronger than necessary, but easier to verify. A special case is the notion of strong monotonicity typically considered in the literature, which requires that each agent's allocation be increasing in his current and past reports in every period, and which is applicable to models where payoffs satisfy a singlecrossing property and where type transitions are independent of allocations and increasing in past types in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Having identified the underlying integralmonotonicity condition, we are able to relax both the notion of monotonicity and the requirements on the environment. Heuristically, this amounts to requiring monotonicity only "on average" across time (ex-post monotonicity) or, weaker still, across time and future types (average monotonicity). We use these new conditions to establish the implementability of the optimal allocation rule in settings where strong monotonicity fails.
The leading application for our results is the design of optimal mechanisms in Markov environments. 5 We adopt the first-order approach familiar from static settings where an allocation rule is 3 The result is useful in the non-quasilinear models of footnote 1. There it determines the ex post net present value of the agent's utility from monetary payments, and facilitates computing the cost-minimizing timing of payments. 4 Implementability has been characterized in static models in terms of analogous conditions by Rochet (1987) , and more recently by Carbajal and Ely (2010) and Berge, Müller, and Naeemi (2010). 5 In the supplementary material, we discuss how our characterization of incentive compatibility for Markov environ-found by solving a relaxed problem that only imposes local incentive-compatibility constraints and the lowest initial types' participation constraints, and where a monotonicity condition is used to verify the implementability of the rule. The envelope formula from Theorem 1 can be used as in static settings to show that the principal's problem is then to maximize expected virtual surplus, which is only a function of the allocation rule. This is a Markov decision problem, and hence it can be solved using standard methods. We then use integral monotonicity from Theorem 3 to verify that the solution is implementable, possibly by checking one of the sufficient conditions discussed above.
When this is the case, the optimal payments can be found by using Theorem 2. If for each agent the lowest initial type is the one worst off under the candidate allocation rule (which is the case, for example, when utilities are increasing in own types and transitions satisfy first-order stochastic dominance), then the participation constraints of all initial types are satisfied, and the mechanism so constructed is an optimal dynamic mechanism.
The impulse response functions play a central role in explaining the direction and dynamics of distortions in optimal dynamic mechanisms. As in static settings, distortions are introduced to reduce the agents' expected information rents, as computed at the time of contracting. However, because of the serial correlation of types, it is optimal to distort allocations not only in the initial period, but at every history at which the agent's type is responsive to his initial type, as measured by the impulse response function. We illustrate by means of a buyer-seller example that this can lead to the distortions being non-monotone in the agent's reports and over time. The optimal allocation rule in the example is not strongly monotone, and hence the new sufficiency conditions derived from integral monotonicity are instrumental for uncovering these novel dynamics.
Similarly to static settings, the first-order approach outlined above yields an implementable allocation rule only under fairly stringent conditions, which are by no means generic. We provide some sufficient conditions on the primitives that guarantee that the relaxed problem has a solution that satisfies strong monotonicity, but as is evident from above, such conditions are far from being necessary. We illustrate the broader applicability of the tools by solving for optimal "bandit auctions"
of experiment goods in a setting where bidders update their values upon consumption. The optimal allocation there violates strong monotonicity, but satisfies average monotonicity.
We finish the introduction by commenting on the related literature. The rest of the paper is then organized as follows. We describe the dynamic environment in Section 2, and present our results on incentive compatibility and implementability in Section 3. We then apply these results to the design of optimal dynamic mechanisms in Section 4, illustrating the general approach by deriving the optimal bandit auction in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6. All proofs omitted in the main text are in the Appendix. Additional results can be found in the supplementary material.
ments can be used to derive sufficient conditions for implementability in some classes of non-Markov environments, and to extend our results on optimal mechanisms to such environments.
Related Literature
The literature on optimal dynamic mechanism design goes back to the pioneering work of Baron and Besanko (1984) , who used the first-order approach in a two-period single-agent setting to derive an optimal mechanism for regulating a natural monopoly. They characterized optimal distortions using an "informativeness measure," which is a two-period version of our impulse response function. More recently, Courty and Li (2000) considered a similar model to study optimal advanced ticket sales, and also provided some sufficient conditions for a dynamic allocation rule to be implementable.
Eső and Szentes (2007) then extended the analysis to multiple agents in their study of optimal information revelation in auctions. 6 They orthogonalized an agent's future information by generating the randomness in his second-period type through an independent shock, which corresponds to a twoperiod version of our state representation. We build on some of the ideas and results in these papers, and special cases of some of our results can be found in them. We comment on the connections in more detail at the relevant points in the analysis.
Whereas the aforementioned works considered two-period models, Besanko (1985) and Battaglini (2005) characterized the optimal infinite-horizon mechanism for an agent whose type follows a Markov process, with Besanko considering a linear AR(1) process over a continuum of states, and Battaglini a two-state Markov chain. Their results were qualitatively different: Besanko (1985) found the allocation in each period to depend only on the agent's initial and current type, and to be distorted downward at each finite history with probability 1. In contrast, Battaglini (2005) found that once the agent's type turns high, he consumes at the efficient level irrespective of his subsequent types.
Our analysis shows that the relevant property of the type processes that explains these findings, and the dynamics of distortions more generally, is the impulse response of future types to a change in the agent's initial private information. 7 Optimal mechanisms in a multi-agent environment with an infinite horizon were first considered by Board (2007) . He extended the analysis of Eső and Szentes (2007) to a setting where the timing of the allocation is endogenous, so that the principal is selling options. Subsequent to the first version of our manuscript, Kakade et al (2011) considered a class of allocation problems that generalize Board's model as well as our bandit auctions, and showed that the optimal mechanism is a virtual version of the dynamic pivot mechanism of Bergemann and Välimäki (2010). We comment on the connection to Kakade et al in Section 5 after presenting our bandit auction.
That the literature on optimal dynamic mechanisms has focused on relatively specific settings reflects the need to arrive at a tractable optimization problem over implementable allocation rules.
In contrast, when designing efficient (or expected surplus maximizing) mechanisms, the desired Our work is also related to the literature on dynamic insurance and optimal taxation. While the early literature following Green (1987) Our analysis of optimal mechanisms assumes that the principal can commit to the mechanism he is offering, and hence the dynamics are driven by changes in the agents' information. In contrast, the literature on dynamic contracting with adverse selection and limited commitment typically assumes constant types and generates dynamics through lack of commitment (see, for example, Laffont and Tirole (1988), or, for more recent work, Skreta (2006) and the references therein). 10 Dynamic mechanism design is related to the literature on multidimensional screening, as noted, e.g., by Rochet and Stole (2003) . Nevertheless, there is a sense in which incentive compatibility is easier to ensure in a dynamic setting than in a static multidimensional setting. This is because in a dynamic setting an agent is asked to report each dimension of his private information before learning the subsequent dimensions, and so has fewer deviations available than in the corresponding static setting in which he observes all the dimensions at once. Because of this, the set of implementable allocation rules is larger in a dynamic setting than in the corresponding static multidimensional setting. On the other hand, our necessary conditions for incentive compatibility are valid also for multidimensional screening problems.
8 A general characterization of implementable dynamic allocation rules was derived by Rahman (2010) who extended
The Environment
Conventions. For any set B, B −1 denotes a singleton. If B is measurable, ∆(B) is the set of probability measures over B. Any function defined on a measurable set is assumed measurable.
Tildes distinguish random variables from realizations so that, for example, θ denotes a realization of θ. Any set of real vectors or sequences is endowed with the product order unless noted otherwise.
Decisions. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, . . . , ∞. There are n ≥ 1 agents, indexed by i = 1, . . . , n. In every period t, each agent i observes a signal, or type,
with −∞ ≤ θ it ≤θ it ≤ +∞, and then sends a message to a mechanism which leads to an allocation
x it ∈ X it and a payment p it ∈ R for each agent i. Each X it is assumed to be a measurable space (with the sigma-algebra left implicit). The set of feasible allocation sequences is X ⊂ ∞ t=0 n i=1 X it . This formulation allows for the possibility that feasible allocations in a given period depend on the allocations in the previous periods, or that the feasible allocations for agent i depend on the other
X is , and X t ≡ t s=0 X s . The sets Θ t , Θ t i , and
In every period t, each agent i observes his own allocation x it but not the other agents' allocations x −i,t . 12 The observability of x it should be thought of as a constraint: a mechanism can reveal more information to agent i than x it , but cannot conceal x it . Our necessary conditions for incentive compatibility do not depend on what additional information is disclosed to the agent by the mechanism.
Hence it is convenient to assume that the agents do not observe anything beyond θ it and x it , not even their own transfers. (If the horizon is finite, this is without loss as transfers could be postponed until the end.) As for sufficient conditions, we provide conditions under which more information can be disclosed to the agents without violating incentive compatibility. In particular, we construct payments that can be disclosed in each period, and identify conditions under which the other agents' reports and allocations can also be disclosed.
Types. The evolution of agent i's information is described by a collection of kernels 
:
it xit ≤x}, while the provision of a public good whose period-t production is independent of the level of production in any other period can be modelled by letting
12 This formulation does not explicitly allow for decisions that are not observed by any agent at the time they are made; however, such decisions can be accomodated by introducing a fictitious agent observing them. Preferences. Each agent i has von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries on Θ × X × R ∞ , described by a Bernoulli utility function of the quasilinear form
U i : Θ × X → R, and δ ∈ (0, 1] is a discount factor common to all agents. 13 The special case of "finite horizon" arises when each U i (θ, x) depends only on θ T , x T for some finite T .
Choice rules. A choice rule consists of an allocation rule χ : Θ → X and a transfer rule ψ : Θ → R ∞ × · · · × R ∞ such that for all t ≥ 0, the allocation χ t (θ) and transfers ψ t (θ) implemented in period t depend only on the history θ t (and so will be written as χ t (θ t ) and ψ t (θ t )). We denote the set of feasible allocation rules by X . The restriction to deterministic rules is without loss of generality since randomizations can be generated by introducing a fictitious agent and conditioning on his reports. (Below we provide conditions for an optimal allocation rule to be deterministic.)
, an allocation rule χ ∈ X uniquely defines a stochastic process over Θ, which we denote by λ [χ]. 14 For any period t ≥ 0 and history θ t ∈ Θ t , we let λ [χ] |θ t denote the analogous process whereθ t is first drawn from a degenerate distribution at θ t , and then the continuation process is generated by applying the kernels and the allocation rule starting from the history (θ t , χ t (θ t )).
When convenient, we view each agent i's private information as being generated by his initial signal θ i0 and a sequence of "independent shocks." That is, we assume that for each agent
is a collection of measurable spaces,
is a collection of probability distributions with G it ∈ ∆(E it ) for t ≥ 0, and
is a sequence of functions such that, for all t ≥ 0 and θ
. Given any allocation rule χ, we can then think of the process λ[χ] being generated as
Draw the period-0 signals θ 0 according to the initial distribution Π n i=1 F i0 independently ofε, and construct types for periods t > 0 recursively by θ it = z it (θ t−1 i , χ t−1 (θ t−1 ), ε it ). (Note that we can think of each 13 As usual, we may alternatively interpret pit as agent i's utility from his period-t payment (See, e.g., Garrett and Pavan (2013) i , x t−1 , ε it ) = φ i θ i,t−1 + ε it for some φ i ∈ R. The general case can be handled as follows:
Example 1 (Canonical representation) Fix the kernels F . For all i = 1, . . . , n, and t ≥ 1, let E it = (0, 1), let G it be the uniform distribution on (0, 1), and define the generalized inverse F
). 16 We refer to the state representation so defined as the canonical representation of F .
Nevertheless, the canonical representation is not always the most convenient as many processes such as the AR (1) In what follows, we use the fact that, given a state representation E i , G i , z i n i=1 , for any period s ≥ 0, each agent i's continuation process can be expressed directly in terms of the history θ s i and shocks ε it , t ≥ 0, by defining the functions
recursively by
Regularity Conditions
Similarly to static models with continuous types, our analysis requires that each agent's expected utility be sufficiently well-behaved function of his private information. In a dynamic model, an agent's expected continuation utility depends on his current type both directly through the utility function as well as through its impact on the distribution of future types. Hence we impose regularity conditions on both the utility functions and the kernels.
Condition (U-D) Utility Differentiable: For all i = 1, . . . , n, t ≥ 0, x ∈ X, and θ ∈ Θ,
With a finite horizon T , this condition simply means that
Condition (U-ELC) Utility Equi-Lipschitz Continuous: For all i = 1, . . . , n, the family
Conditions U-D and U-ELC are roughly analogous to the differentiability and bounded-derivative conditions imposed in static models (c.f., Milgrom and Segal, 2002) . For example, stationary payoffs
satisfy U-D and U-ELC if u i is differentiable and equi-Lipschitz in θ it (e.g., linear payoffs u i (θ t , x t ) = θ it x it are fine provided that x it is bounded).
Condition (F-BE) Process Bounded in Expectation:
For all i = 1, . . . , n, t ≥ 0, θ t ∈ Θ t , and
Condition F-BE implies that, for any allocation rule χ and any period-t type history θ t (t ≥ 0), the sequence of agent i's future types has a finite norm with λ [χ] |θ t -probability 1. This allows us to effectively restrict attention to the space Θ iδ . With a finite horizon, F-BE simply requires that, for all t ≥ 0, the expectation of eachθ iτ , with t < τ ≤ T , exists conditional on any θ t .
Condition (F-BIR) Process Bounded Impulse Responses: There exist a state representation
Condition F-BIR is essentially the process-analog of Conditions U-D and U-ELC. It guarantees that small changes in the current type have a small effect on future types. We provide a way to check F-BIR as well as examples of kernels that satisfy it in later sections.
Finally, we impose the following bounds on the agents' utility functions to ensure that the expected net present value of the transfers we construct exists when the horizon is infinite:
Condition (U-SPR) Utility Spreadable: For all i = 1, . . . , n, there exists a sequence of functions
and constants
The condition is satisfied, for example, if the functions u it are uniformly bounded, or take the linear form u it (θ t , x t ) = θ it x it with X it bounded (but Θ it possibly unbounded).
For ease of reference, we combine the above conditions into a single definition.
Definition 1 (Regular environment) The environment is regular if it satisfies conditions U-D, U-ELC, F-BE, F-BIR, and U-SPR.
· is equivalent to the Euclidean norm, and so the choice is irrelevant. For infinite horizon, increasing δ weakens the conditions imposed on the utility function while strengthening the conditions imposed on the kernels.
PBE-Implementability
Following Myerson (1986), we restrict attention to direct mechanisms where, in every period t, each agent i confidentially reports a type from his type space Θ it , no information is disclosed to him beyond his allocation x it , and the agents report truthfully on the equilibrium path. Such a mechanism induces a dynamic Bayesian game between the agents, and hence we use perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)
as our solution concept.
Formally, a reporting strategy for agent i is a collection
, where 
. Note that there are no restrictions on the behavior that an on-path truthful strategy may prescribe following lies.
The specification of a PBE also includes a belief system Γ, which describes each agent i's beliefs at each of his information sets (θ 
, agent i's beliefs are independent of his true type history θ t i .
B(ii)
For all i = 1, . . . , n, t ≥ 0, and (θ
, agent i's beliefs assign probability 1 to the other agents having reported truthfully, i.e., to the event thatθ
Condition B(i) is similar to condition B(i) in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p.331). It is motivated
by the fact that, given agent i's reportsθ
and observed allocations x t−1 i , the distribution of his true types θ t i is independent of the other agents' types or reports. Condition B(ii) in turn says that agent i always believes that his opponents have been following their equilibrium strategies. 18 Note that under these two conditions, we can describe agent i's beliefs as a collection of probability Definition 2 (On-path truthful PBE; PBIC) An on-path truthful PBE of a direct mechanism χ, ψ is a pair (σ, Γ) consisting of an on-path truthful strategy profile σ and a belief system Γ 18 With continuous types, any particular history for agent i has probability 0, and hence B(ii) cannot be derived from Bayes' rule but has to be imposed. Note that even when the kernels do not have full support, they are defined at all histories, and hence the continuation process is always well defined.
such that (i) Γ satisfies conditions B(i) and B(ii) and is consistent with Bayes' rule on all positiveprobability events given σ, and (ii) for all i = 1, . . . , n, σ i maximizes agent i's expected payoff at each information set given σ −i and Γ. 19 The choice rule χ, ψ is Perfect Bayesian Incentive Compatible (PBIC) if the corresponding direct mechanism has an on-path truthful PBE.
Since the strategy profile σ is on-path truthful, part (i) in the above definition depends only on the allocation rule χ, and hence we write Γ(χ) for the set of belief systems satisfying part (i). (Each element of Γ(χ) is a system of regular conditional probability distributions, the existence of which is well known; see, for example, Dudley, 2002.) Note that the concept of PBIC implies, in particular, that truthful reporting is optimal at every truthful history.
First-Order Necessary Conditions
We start by deriving a necessary condition for PBIC by applying an envelope theorem to an agent's problem of choosing an optimal reporting strategy at an arbitrary truthful history.
Fix a choice rule χ, ψ and a belief system Γ ∈ Γ(χ). Suppose agent i plays according to an on-path truthful strategy, and consider a period-t history of the form ((θ
that is, when agent i has reported truthfully in the past, the complete reporting history is θ t−1 , and agent i's current type is θ it . Agent i's expected payoff is then given by
where λ i [χ, Γ]|θ t−1 , θ it is the stochastic process over Θ from the perspective of agent i. Formally,
is the unique probability measure on Θ obtained by first drawing θ
, and then using the allocation rule χ and the kernels F to generate the process from period-t onwards.
Note that in period 0, this measure is only a function of the kernels, and hence we write it as λ i [χ]|θ i0 , and similarly omit the belief system Γ in V χ,ψ i0
The following is a dynamic version of the envelope condition familiar from static models:
. . , n and s ≥ 0. The choice rule χ, ψ with belief system
function of θ is with the derivative given a.e. by
19 In particular, the expected allocation utility and the expected net present value of transfers from an on-path truthful strategy are well-defined and finite conditional on any truthful history.
where 20
The choice rule χ, ψ satisfies ICFOC if there exists a belief system Γ ∈ Γ(χ) such that χ, ψ with belief system Γ satisfies ICFOC i,s for all agents i = 1, . . . , n and all periods s ≥ 0.
Theorem 1 Suppose the environment is regular. 21 Then every PBIC choice rule satisfies ICFOC.
By Theorem 1, the formula in (1) is a dynamic generalization of the envelope formula familiar from static mechanism design (Mirrlees, 1971 , Myerson, 1981 . By inspection, the period-0 formula implies a weak form of dynamic payoff (and revenue) equivalence: each agent's period-0 interim expected payoff is pinned down by the allocation rule χ up to a constant. (We provide a stronger payoff-equivalence result in the next section.) Special cases of the envelope formula (1) have been identified by Baron and Besanko (1984) , Besanko (1985) , Courty and Li (2000) , and Eső and Szentes (2007), among others. However, it should be noted that the contribution of Theorem 1 is not just in generalizing the formula, but in providing conditions on the utility functions and type processes that imply that ICFOC is indeed a necessary condition for all PBIC choice rules.
Heuristically, the proof of Theorem 1 in the Appendix proceeds by applying an envelope-theorem argument to the normal form of an agent's problem of choosing an optimal continuation strategy at a given truthful history. The argument is identical across agents and periods, and hence without loss of generality we focus on establishing ICFOC i,0 for some agent i by considering his period-0 ex-interim problem of choosing a reporting strategy conditional on his initial signal θ i0 . Nevertheless, Theorem 1 is not an immediate corollary of Milgrom and Segal's (2002) envelope theorem for arbitrary choice sets. Namely, their result requires that the objective function be differentiable in the parameter (with an appropriately bounded derivative) for any feasible element of the choice set. Here it would require that, for any initial reportθ i0 and any plan ρ ≡ ρ t :
for reporting future signals, agent i's payoff be differentiable in θ i0 . But this property need not hold in a regular environment. This is because a change in the initial signal θ i0 changes the distribution of the agent's future signals, which in turn changes the distribution of his future reports and allocations through the plan ρ and the choice rule χ, ψ . For some combinations ofθ 0 , ρ, and χ, ψ , this may lead to an expected payoff that is non-differentiable or even discontinuous in θ i0 . 22 20 The I i,(s),t functions are conditional expectations and thus defined only up to sets of measure 0. 21 Condition U-SPR, which requires utility to be spreadable, is not used in the proof of this theorem. 22 For a simple example, consider a two-period environment with one agent and a single indivisible good to be allocated in the second period as in Courty and Li (2000) (i.e., X0 = {0}, X1 = {0, 1}). Suppose the agent's payoff is of the form U (θ, x) = θ1x1, and thatθ0 is distributed uniformly on (0, 1) withθ1 =θ0 almost surely. (It is straigthforward to verify that this environment is regular; e.g., put Z1(θ0, ε1) = θ0 for all (θ0, ε1) to verify F-BIR). Consider the PBIC choice rule χ, ψ where χ is defined by
, and χ 1 (θ0, θ1) = 0 otherwise, and where ψ is defined by setting ψ 0 = 0 and ψ 1 (θ0, θ1) = and fix the plan ρ that
To deal with this complication, we transform the problem into one where the distribution of agent i's future information is independent of his initial signal θ i0 so that changing θ i0 leaves future reports unaltered. 23 This is done by using a state representation to generate the signal process and by asking the agent to report his initial signal θ i0 and his future shocks ε it , t ≥ 1. This equivalent formulation provides an additional simplification in that we may assume that agent i reports the shocks truthfully. 24 The rest of the proof then amounts to showing that if the environment is regular, then the transformed problem is sufficiently well-behaved to apply arguments similar to those in Milgrom and Segal (2002) .
Remark 1 If the notion of incentive compatibility is weakened from PBIC to the requirement that on-path truthful strategies are a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the direct mechanism, then the above argument can still be applied in period 0 to establish ICFOC i,0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Thus the weak payoff equivalence discussed above holds across all Bayesian-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms.
We finish this subsection with two examples that suggest an interpretation of the functions defined by (2) and establish a connection to the literature. To simplify notation, we restrict attention to the case of a single agent and omit the subscript i.
Example 2 (AR(k) process) Consider the case of a single agent, and suppose that the signal θ t evolves according to an autoregressive (AR) process that is independent of the allocations:
φ jθt−j +ε t , whereθ t = 0 for all t < 0, φ j ∈ R for all j ∈ N, andε t is a random variable distributed according to some c.d.f. G t with support E t ⊂ R, with all theε t , t ≥ 0, distributed independently of each other and ofθ 0 . Note that we have defined the process in terms of the state representation E, G, z , where
The functions (2) are then time-varying scalars
reports θ1 truthfully in period 1 (i.e., ρ(θ1) = θ1 for all θ1). The resulting expected payoff isθ0 −
whereas it is equal to 0 for all θ0 =θ0. That is, the expected payoff is discontinuous in the true initial type at θ0 =θ0. 23 In an earlier draft we showed that, when the horizon is finite, the complication can alternatively be dealt with by using backward induction. Roughly, this solves the problem as it forces the agent to use a sequentially rational continuation strategy given any initial report, and thus rules out problematic elements of his feasible set. 24 By PBIC, truthtful reporting remains optimal in the restricted problem where the agent can only chooseθ0, and hence the value function that we are trying to characterize is unaffected. (In terms of the kernel representation, this amounts to restricting each type θi0 to using strategies where given any initial reportθi0 ∈ Θi0, the agent is constrained to reportθit = Zit(θi0, x t−1 i , ε t i ) in period t.) Note that restricting the agent to report truthfully his future θit would not work as the resulting restricted problem is not sufficiently well-behaved in general; see footnote 22. In the special case of an AR(1) process, as in Besanko (1985) , we have φ j = 0 for all j > 1, and hence the formula simplifies to I (s),t = (φ 1 ) t−s . Condition F-BIR requires that there exist B ∈ R such that I (s) ≡ ∞ t=0 δ t I (s),t < B for all s ≥ 0, which in the AR(1) case is satisfied if and only if
. Hence, F-BE is ensured by assuming, in addition to the bound B needed for F-BIR, that E [ ε ] < ∞, which simply requires that the mean of the shocks grows slower than the discount rate. (E.g., it is trivially satisfied if ε t are i.i.d. with a finite mean.)
The constants defined by (3) coincide with the impulse responses of a linear AR process. More generally, the I (s),t functions in (2) can be interpreted as nonlinear impulse responses. To see this,
apply Theorem 1 to a regular single-agent environment with fixed decisions and no payments (i.e., with X t = {x t } and ψ t (θ) = 0 for all t ≥ 0 and θ ∈ Θ), in which case optimization is irrelevant, and
Note that the impulse response functions I (s),t are determined entirely by the stochastic process and satisfy the above equation for any utility function U satisfying Conditions U-D and U-ELC. 25 If for all t ≥ 1, the function z t in the state representation of the type process is differentiable in θ t−1 , we can use the chain rule to inductively calculate the impulse responses as
The derivative ∂z m /∂θ l can be interpreted as the "direct impulse response" of the signal in period m to the signal in period l < m. The "total" impulse response ∂Z (s),t /∂θ s is then obtained by adding up the products of the direct impulse responses over all possible causation chains from period s to period t. Applying this observation to the canonical representation yields a simple formula for the impulse responses and a possible way to verify that the kernels satisfy Condition F-BIR:
Example 3 (Canonical impulse responses) Suppose that, for all t ≥ 1 and x t−1 ∈ X t−1 , the
, and let f t (·|θ t−1 , x t−1 ) denote the density of F t (·|θ t−1 , x t−1 ). Then the direct impulse responses in the canonical representation of Example 1 take the form, for (θ
, where we have used the implicit function theorem. Plugging this into equation (4) yields a formula for the impulse responses directly in terms of the kernels. For example, if the agent's type evolves according to a Markov process whose kernels are independent of decisions, the formula simplifies to
because then the only causation chain passes through all periods. Two-period versions of this formula appear in Baron and Besanko (1984) , Courty and Li (2000) , and Eső and Szentes (2007).
As for Condition F-BIR, because the canonical impulse responses are directly in terms of the kernels F , it is straightforward to back out conditions that guarantee the existence of the bounding
For example, in the case of a Markov process, it is grossly sufficient that there exists a sequence y ∈ Θ δ such that for all t ≥ 0, (θ t−1 , θ t ) ∈ Θ t−1 × Θ t , and
we have
≤ y t . The general case can be handled similarly.
Remark 2 Baron and Besanko (1984) suggested interpreting
as a measure of "informativeness" of θ 0 about θ 1 . We find the term "impulse response" preferable. First, for linear processes, it matches the usage in the time-series literature. Second, it is more precise. For example, in the two-period case, ifθ 1 =θ 0 +ε 1 withε 1 normally distributed with mean zero, then the impulse response is identical to 1 regardless of the variance ofε 1 . On the other hand, θ 0 is more informative about θ 1 (in the sense of Blackwell) the smaller the variance ofε 1 .
Payment Construction and Equivalence
Similarly to static settings, for any allocation rule (and belief system), it is possible to use the envelope formula to construct transfers that satisfy first-order conditions at all truthful histories:
Fix an allocation rule χ and a belief system Γ ∈ Γ(χ). For all i = 1, . . . , n, s ≥ 0, and θ ∈ Θ, let
and Q χ,Γ is
where θ i ∈ Θ iδ is some arbitrary fixed type sequence. Define the transfer rule ψ by setting, for all i = 1, . . . , n, t ≥ 0, and θ t ∈ Θ t ,
Hence the transfer in (7) can be interpreted as agent i's information rent (over type θ i ) as perceived in period t, net of the rent he expects from the next period, and net of the expected flow utility. We show below that these transfers satisfy ICFOC.
In order to address their uniqueness, we introduce the following condition. This condition means that observing θ it never gives agent i any information about the other agents' types. Clearly, all allocation rules satisfy it when agent i's type evolves autonomously from allocations, or (trivially) in a single-agent setting. We then have our second main result: 26
Theorem 2 Suppose the environment is regular. Then the following statements are true:
(i) Given an allocation rule χ and a belief system Γ ∈ Γ(χ), let ψ be the transfer rule defined by (7) . Then the choice rule χ, ψ satisfies ICFOC, and for all i = 1, . . . , n, s ≥ 0, θ s−1 ∈ Θ s−1 , and
(ii) Let χ be an allocation rule that leaks no information to agent i, and let ψ andψ be transfer rules such that the choice rules χ, ψ and χ,ψ are PBIC. Then there exists a constant
Remark 3
The flow payments ψ it θ t defined by (7) are measurable with respect to θ
Thus, they do not reveal to agent i any information beyond that contained in the allocations x i .
Hence they can be disclosed to the agent without affecting his beliefs or incentives.
As noted after Theorem 1, ICFOC i,0 immediately pins down, up to a constant, the expected net present value of payments that implement a given allocation rule χ is pinned down up to a single constant with probability 1 (that 26 The notation λi [χ] |θi in the proposition denotes the unique measure over the other agents' types Θ−i that is obtained from the kernels F and the allocation χ by fixing agent i's reports atθi = θi.
is
The ex-post equivalence of payments is useful for solving mechanism design problems in which the principal cares not just about the expected net present value of payments, but also about how the payments vary with the state θ or over time. For example, this includes settings where ψ t (θ) is interpreted as the "utility payment" to the agent in period t, whose monetary cost to the principal is γ (ψ t (θ)) for some function γ, as in models with a risk-averse agent. In such models, knowing the net present value of the "utility payments" required to implement a given allocation rule allows computing the cost-minimizing distribution of monetary payments over time (see, for example, Farhi and Werning (2011), or Garrett and Pavan (2013)).
A Characterization for Markov Environments
In order to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for PBE-implementability, we focus on Markov environments, defined formally as follows:
Definition 5 (Markov environment) The environment is Markov if, for all i = 1, . . . , n, the following conditions hold:
(ii) For all t ≥ 1 and x t−1 i
only through θ i,t−1 (and is hence denoted by F it θ it−1 , x t−1 i
), and there exist constants φ i and (E it ) ∞ t=0 , with δφ i < 1 and E i < ∞, such that for all θ it , x t i ∈ Θ it × X t i , E
This definition implies that each agent i's type process is a Markov decision process, and that his vNM preferences over future lotteries depend on his type history θ t i only through θ it (but can depend on past decisions x t−1 ). The strengthening of Condition F-BE embedded in part (ii) of the definition allows us to establish an appropriate version of the one-stage-deviation principle for the model. Note that every Markov process satisfies the bounds if the sets Θ it are bounded.
The key simplification afforded by the Markov assumption is that in a Markov environment, an agent's reporting incentives in any period t depend only on his current true type and his past reports, but not on his past true types. In particular, if it is optimal for the agent to report truthfully when past reports have been truthful (as in an on-path truthful PBE), then it is also optimal for him to report truthfully even if he has lied in the past. This implies that we can restrict attention to PBE in strongly truthful strategies, that is, in strategies that report truthfully at all histories.
We say that the allocation rule χ ∈ X is PBE-implementable if there exists a transfer rule ψ such that the direct mechanism χ, ψ has an on-path truthful PBE (i.e., it is PBIC). Respectively, we say that χ is strongly PBE-implementable if there exists a transfer rule ψ such that the direct mechanism χ, ψ has a strongly truthful PBE. Given an allocation rule χ, for all i = 1, . . . , n, t ≥ 0, choice rule with allocation rule χ and belief system Γ. We then have our third main result:
Theorem 3 Suppose the environment is regular and Markov. An allocation rule χ ∈ X is PBEimplementable if and only if, there exists a belief system Γ ∈ Γ(χ) such that for all i = 1, . . . , n, t ≥ 0, θ it ,θ it ∈ Θ it , and θ t−1 ∈ Θ t−1 , the following integral monotonicity condition holds:
When this is the case, χ is strongly PBE-implementable with payments given by (7).
The static version of Theorem 3 has appeared in the literature on implementability (see Rochet (1987) or Carbajal and Ely (2010) and the references therein). The basic idea in our proof of the dynamic version is to show that, in every period t, each agent i's problem of reporting a current type is sufficiently well-behaved to allow applying the following simple lemma:
Lipschitz continuous function of θ, and (b)Φ(θ) ≡ Φ(θ, θ) is a Lipschitz continuous function of θ.
Proof. For all θ,θ ∈ (θ, θ), let g(θ,θ) ≡Φ(θ) − Φ(θ,θ). For any fixedθ ∈ (θ, θ), g(θ,θ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ by (a) and (b). Hence, it is absolutely continuous, and
Therefore, for all θ ∈ (θ, θ), Φ(θ,θ) is maximized by settingθ = θ if and only if (9) holds.
In the special case of a static model, the necessity of the integral monotonicity condition (8) readily follows from Theorem 1 and Lemma 1: There, for any fixed messageθ i , agent i's expected payoff can simply be assumed (equi-)Lipschitz continuous and differentiable in the true type θ i . By Theorem 1, this implies Lipschitz continuity of his equilibrium payoff in θ i so that necessity of integral monotonicity follows by Lemma 1.
In contrast, in the dynamic model, fixing agent i's period-t messageθ it , the Lipschitz continuity of his expected payoff in the current type θ it (or the formula for its derivative) cannot be assumed but must be derived from the agent's future optimizing behavior (see the counterexample in footnote 22). In particular, we show that in a Markov environment, the fact that the choice rule χ, ψ implementing χ satisfies ICFOC (by Theorem 1) implies that the agent's expected payoff under a one-step deviation from truthtelling satisfies a condition analogous to ICFOC with respect to the modified choice rule χ •θ it , ψ •θ it induced by the lie. This step is non-trivial and uses the fact that, in a Markov environment, truthtelling is an optimal continuation strategy following the lie.
Since the agent's expected equilibrium payoff at any truthful history is Lipschitz continuous in the current type by Theorem 1, the necessity of integral monotonicity then follows by Lemma 1.
The other key difference pertains to the sufficiency part of the result: In a static environment, the payments constructed using the envelope formula ICFOC guarantee that the agent's payoff under truthtelling is Lipschitz continuous and satisfies ICFOC by construction. Incentive compatibility then follows from integral monotonicity by Lemma 1. In contrast, in the dynamic model, the payments defined by (7) guarantee only that ICFOC is satisfied at truthful histories (by Theorem 2(ii)).
However, in a Markov environment it is irrelevant for the agent's continuation payoff whether he has been truthful in the past or not, and hence ICFOC extends to all histories. Thus, by Lemma 1, integral monotonicity implies that one-stage deviations from truthtelling are unprofitable. Establishing a one-stage-deviation principle for the environment then concludes the proof. 27 Remark 4 Theorem 3 can be extended to characterize strong PBE-implementability in non-Markov environments. However, for such environments, the restriction to strongly truthful PBE is in general with loss. In the supplementary material, we show that this approach nevertheless allows us to verify the implementability of the optimal allocation rule in some specific non-Markov environments.
Verifying Integral Monotonicity
The integral monotonicity condition (8) is in general not an easy object to work with. This is true even in static models, except for the special class of environments where both the type and the allocation are unidimensional and the agent's payoff is supermodular, in which case integral monotonicity is equivalent to the monotonicity of the allocation rule. Our dynamic problem essentially never falls into this class: Even if the agent's current type is unidimensional, his report will in general affect the allocation both in the current period as well as in all future periods, which renders the allocation space multidimensional. For this reason, we provide monotonicity conditions which are stronger than integral monotonicity but easier to verify. 28 Some of these sufficient conditions apply only to environments satisfying additional restrictions: 27 The usual version of the one-stage-deviation principle (for example, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p.110) is not applicable since payoffs are a priori not continuous at infinity because flow payments need not be bounded. 28 For similar sufficient conditions for static models with a unidimensional type and multidimensional allocation space, see, for example, Matthews and Moore (1987), whose condition is analogous to our strong monotonicity, and Garcia (2005), whose condition is analogous to our ex-post monotonicity.
Condition (F-AUT) Process Autonomous:
For all i = 1, . . . , n, t ≥ 1, and θ t−1 i
does not depend on x t−1 i . (i) Single-crossing: For all i = 1, . . . , n, t ≥ 0, θ t−1 ∈ Θ t−1 ,θ it ∈ Θ it , and a.e.
Condition (F-FOSD)
(ii) Average monotonicity: For all i = 1, . . . , n, t ≥ 0, and
is nondecreasing inθ it .
(iii) Ex-post monotonicity: Condition F-AUT holds, and for all i = 1, . . . , n, t ≥ 0, and θ ∈ Θ,
(iv) Strong monotonicity: Conditions F-AUT and F-FOSD hold, and for all i = 1, . . . , n, t ≥ 0, and θ −i ∈ Θ −i , X it ⊂ R m , U i (θ, x) has increasing differences in (θ i , x i ) and is independent of x −i , and χ i (θ) is nondecreasing in θ i .
To see the relationship between the conditions, observe that the most stringent of the four, strong monotonicity, amounts to the requirement that each individual term in the sum in (10) be nondecreasing inθ it (note that, under F-FOSD, I i,(t),τ ≥ 0). Ex-post monotonicity weakens this by requiring only that the sum be nondecreasing, which permits us to dispense with F-FOSD as well as with the assumption that U i has increasing differences. By recalling the definition of the D functions in (6), we see that average monotonicity in turn weakens ex-post monotonicity by averaging over states, which also permits us to dispense with F-AUT. Finally, single-crossing relaxes average monotonicity by requiring that the expectation of the sum in (10) changes sign only once atθ it = θ it , as opposed to being monotone inθ it . But single-crossing clearly implies integral monotonicity, proving the corollary. The following example illustrates:
Example 4 Consider a regular Markov environment with one agent whose allocation utility takes the form U (θ, x) = ∞ t=0 δ t θ t x t , where for all t ≥ 0, the period-t consumption x t is an element of some unidimensional set X t ⊂ R. Suppose that conditions F-AUT and F-FOSD hold. By (6),
Thus, average monotonicity requires that increasing the current messageθ t increases the agent's average discounted consumption, where period-τ consumption is discounted using the discount factor δ as well as the impulse response I (t),τ (θ τ ) of period-τ signal to period-t signal. Ex-post monotonicity requires that the discounted consumption ∞ t=τ δ τ I (t),τ (θ τ ) χ t (θ t , θ −t ) be increasing inθ t along every path θ. And strong monotonicity requires that increasingθ t increases consumption χ τ (θ t , θ −t ) in every period τ ≥ t irrespective of the agent's signals in the other periods.
Courty and Li (2000) studied a two-period version of Example 4 with allocation
only in the second period (i.e., X t = {0} for all t = 1), and provided sufficient conditions for implementability in two cases. The first (their Lemma 3.3) assumes F-FOSD and corresponds to our strong monotonicity. This case was extended to many agents by Eső and Szentes (2007) . 29 The second case assumes that varying the initial signal θ 0 induces a mean-preserving spread by rotating
Courty and Li showed (as their Lemma 3.4) that it is then possible to implement any χ 1 that is non-increasing in θ 0 , non-decreasing in θ 1 , and satisfies "no under production:" χ 1 (θ 0 , θ 1 ) = 1 for all θ 1 ≥ z. 30 This case is covered by our ex-post monotonicity, which in period 0 requires that I (0),1 (θ 0 , θ 1 ) χ 1 (θ 0 , θ 1 ) be non-decreasing inθ 0 . To see this, note that by the canonical impulse response formula (5), we have I (0),1 (θ 0 , θ 1 ) ≤ 0 (resp., ≥ 0) if θ 1 ≤ z (resp., ≥ z). Thus I (0),1 (θ 0 , θ 1 ) χ 1 (θ 0 , θ 1 ) is weakly increasing inθ 0 if θ 1 ≤ z, because χ 1 is non-increasing in θ 0 , whereas it is constant inθ 0 if θ 1 ≥ z, because χ 1 satisfies no under production.
The main application of Corollary 1 is in the design of optimal dynamic mechanisms, which we turn to in the next section. There, a candidate allocation rule is obtained by solving a suitable relaxed problem, and then Corollary 1 is used to verify that the allocation rule is indeed implementable. The rule fails to be strongly monotone, or where the kernels naturally depend on past decisions or fail first-order stochastic dominance. For instance, the optimal allocation rule in Example 5 below fails 29 Eső and Szentes derived the result in terms of a state representation. Translated to the primitive types θi0 and θi1
(or vi and Vi in their notation), their Corollary 1 shows that the allocation rule they are interested in implementing is strongly monotone. Note that Eső and Szentes's display (22) is a special case of our integral monotonicity condition, but stated in terms of a state representation. However, they used it only in conjuction with strong monotonicity. 30 Courty and Li also considered the analogous case of "no over production," to which similar comments apply.
strong monotonicity but satisfies ex-post monotonicity, whereas the optimal allocation rule in the bandit auctions of Section 5 fails ex-post monotonicity but satisfies average monotonicity.
Remark 5 Suppose the environment is regular and Markov. Then for any allocation rule χ that satisfies ex-post monotonicity, there exists a transfer rule ψ such that the complete information version of the model (where agents observe each others' types) has a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in strongly truthful strategies. In other words, ex-post monotone allocation rules can be implemented in a periodic ex-post equilibrium in the sense of Athey and Segal (2012) and Bergemann and Välimäki (2010) . This implies that any such rule can be implemented in a strongly truthful PBE of a direct mechanism where all reports, allocations, and payments are public. The transfers that guarantee this can be constructed as in (7) with the measures λ i [Γ] |θ t−1 , θ it replaced by the measure λ|θ t .
Optimal Mechanisms
We now show how Theorems 1-3 can be used in the design of optimal dynamic mechanisms in Markov environments. 31 To this end, we introduce a principal (labeled as "agent 0") whose payoff takes the
The principal seeks to design a PBIC mechanism to maximize his expected payoff. As is standard in the literature, we assume that the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agents in period zero, after each agent i has observed his initial type θ i0 . Each agent can either accept the mechanism, or reject it to obtain his reservation payoff, which we normalize to 0 for all agents and types. 32 The principal's mechanism design problem is thus to maximize his ex-ante expected payoff
by choosing a feasible choice rule χ, ψ that is PBIC and satisfies
(θ i0 ) ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n and θ i0 ∈ Θ i0 .
Any solution to this problem is referred to as an optimal mechanism.
31 For other possible applications, see, for example, Skrzypacz and Toikka (2013) who consider the feasibility of efficient dynamic contracting in repeated trade and in other dynamic collective choice problems. 32 If an agent can accept the mechanism, but can then quit at a later stage, participation constraints have to be introduced in all periods t ≥ 0. However, in our quasilinear environment with unlimited transfers, the principal can ask the agent to post a sufficiently large bond upon acceptance, to be repaid later, so as to make it unprofitable to quit and forfeit the bond at any time during the mechanism. (With an infinite horizon, annuities can be used in place of bonds.) For this reason, we ignore participation constraints in periods t > 0. Note that in non-quasilinear settings where agents have a consumption-smoothing motive, bonding is costly, and hence participation constraints may bind in many periods (see, for example, Hendel and Lizzeri, 2003) .
We restrict attention to regular environments throughout this section, and assume that the initial distribution F i0 of each agent i is absolutely continuous with density f i0 (θ i0 ) > 0 for almost every θ i0 ∈ Θ i0 , and, for simplicity, that the set of initial types Θ i0 is bounded from below (i.e., θ i0 > −∞).
Hence we can use ICFOC i,0 (by Theorem 1) as in static settings to rewrite the principal's payoff as F i0 (θ i1 )) is the hazard rate of agent i's period-0 type. The first term above is the expected (dynamic) virtual surplus, which is only a function of the allocation rule χ. 33 The principal's problem is in general analytically intractable. Hence we adopt the "first-order approach" typically followed in the literature. In particular, we consider a relaxed problem where PBIC is relaxed to the requirement that χ, ψ satisfy ICFOC i,0 for all i, and where a participation constraint is imposed only on each agent's lowest initial type, that is, (11) is replaced with
Since subtracting a constant from agent i's period-0 transfer leaves ICFOC i,0 unaffected but increases the principal's payoff, the constraints (12) must bind at a solution. It follows that an allocation rule χ * is part of a solution to our relaxed problem if, and only if, χ * maximizes
This problem is in general a dynamic programming problem, and, in contrast to static settings, it cannot be solved pointwise in general. Note that as the definition of the relaxed problem uses ICFOC i,0 , Theorem 1 plays a key role in identifying the candidate allocation rule χ * .
If the environment is Markov, then Theorem 3 can be used to verify whether the candidate allocation rule χ * is PBE-implementable (possibly by checking one of the conditions in Corollary 1).
In case the answer is affirmative, Theorem 2 provides a formula for constructing a transfer rule ψ such that χ * , ψ is PBIC. We can then subtract the constant V χ * ,ψ i0 (θ i0 ) from each agent i's initial transfer to get a PBIC choice rule χ * , ψ
(θ i0 ) = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Thus it remains to verify that all the other participation constraints in (11) are satisfied. As part of the next result, we show that F-FOSD is a sufficient condition for this provided that each agent's utility is increasing in his own type sequence (endowed with the pointwise order). 33 Recall that the proof of Theorem 1 uses only deviations in which, in terms of a state representation, each agent i reports his future shocks εit, t > 0, truthfully. Hence, as noted by Eső and Szentes (2007) , this expression also gives the principal's payoff in a model where the shocks are observable to the principal. However, the set of PBIC choice rules in the latter model is strictly larger so the principal's problems in the two models are not equivalent in general.
Corollary 2 (Optimal mechanisms) Suppose the environment is regular and Markov. Suppose in addition that Condition F-FOSD holds and, for all i = 1, . . . , n and (θ, x) ∈ Θ × X, U i (θ, x) is nondecreasing in θ i . Let χ * be an allocation rule that maximizes the expected virtual surplus (13) , and suppose that, with some belief system Γ ∈ Γ(χ * ), it satisfies the integral monotonicity condition (8) in all periods. Then the following statements hold:
(i) There exists a transfer rule ψ * such that (a) the direct mechanism χ, ψ * has a strongly truthful PBE with belief system Γ and where, for all i = 1, . . . , n, the flow payments ψ * it , t ≥ 0, can be disclosed to agent i; (b) the period-0 participation constraints (11) are satisfied; and (c) the period-0 participation constraints of the lowest initial types (12) hold with equality.
(ii) The above choice rule χ * , ψ * maximizes the principal's expected payoff across all PBIC choice rules that satisfy participation constraints (11).
(iii) If χ, ψ is optimal for the principal among all PBIC choice rules that satisfy participation constraints (11), then χ maximizes the expected virtual surplus (13) .
(iv) The principal's expected payoff cannot be increased by using randomized mechanisms.
Remark 6
The statements (ii)-(iv) remain true if PBIC is weakened to the requirement that there exists a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in on-path truthful strategies. This is because the derivation of the expected virtual surplus (13) (θ i0 ) is nondecreasing in θ i0 by the envelope formula (1) given that U i is nondecreasing in θ i .
Parts (ii) and (iii) follow by the arguments preceding the corollary.
Finally, for part (iv) note that a randomized mechanism is equivalent to a mechanism that conditions on the random types of a fictitious agent. Since the expected virtual surplus in this augmented setting is independent of the signals of the fictitious agent and still takes the form (13), it is still maximized by the non-randomized allocation rule χ * . Thus, applying parts (i) and (ii) to the augmented setting implies that the deterministic choice rule χ * , ψ * maximizes the principal's ), these assumptions can be dispensed with.
Corollary 2 provides a guess-and-verify approach analogous to that typically followed in static settings. We illustrate its usefulness below by using it to discuss optimal distortions in dynamic contracts, and to find optimal "bandit auctions." Similarly to static settings, however, the conditions under which the relaxed problem has an implementable solution are by no means generic. As pointed out by Battaglini and Lamba (2012) , a particularly problematic case obtains when the type of an agent remains constant with high probability, but nevertheless has a small probability of being renewed. In terms of our analysis, the problem is that then the impulse response becomes highly non-monotone in the current type, which in turn may result in the allocation being so non-monotone in the current type that integral monotonicity is violated. 34 It is, of course, possible to reverse-engineer conditions that guarantee that the relaxed problem has an implementable solution, but given the complexity of the problem, such conditions tend to be grossly sufficient. Nevertheless, for completeness we provide sufficient conditions for an allocation rule that maximizes expected virtual surplus to satisfy strong monotonicity of Corollary 1.
Condition (U-COMP) Utility Complementarity: X is a lattice, 35 and for all i = 0, . . . , n, t ≥ 0 and θ ∈ Θ, U i (θ, x) is supermodular in x, and −∂U i (θ, x) /∂θ it is supermodular in x.
This condition holds weakly in the special case where X t is a subset of R in every period t, and the payoffs U i (θ, x) are additively separable in x t . More generally, U-COMP allows for strict complementarity across time, e.g., as in habit-formation models where higher consumption today increases the marginal utility of consumption tomorrow.
Condition (U-DSEP) Utility Decision-Separable: X = ∞ t=0 X t and, for all i = 0, . . . , n, and
Proposition 1 (Primitive conditions for strong monotonicity) Suppose the environment is regular and Markov, Conditions F-AUT and F-FOSD hold, and for all i = 0, . . . , n, and t ≥ 0, X it is a subset of an Euclidean space. Suppose that either of the following conditions is satisfied:
(i) Condition U-COMP holds, and for all i = 1, . . . , n, agent i's virtual utility
has increasing differences in (θ, x), and the same is true of the principal's utility U 0 (x, θ).
(ii) Condition U-DSEP holds, and for all i = 1, . . . , n, and t ≥ 0, X it ⊂ R and there exists a nondecreasing function ϕ it : Θ t i → R m , with m ≤ t, such that agent i's virtual flow utility
For a concrete example, consider a single-agent environment withθ0 distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. Suppose that θ1 =θ0 with probability q, and that with the complementary probabilityθ1 is drawn uniformly from [0, 1] independently ofθ0. The period-0 impulse response is then I (0),1 (θ0, θ1) = 1 {θ 0 =θ 1 } . By inspection of the expected virtual surplus (13), the period-1 allocation is thus distorted only if θ1 = θ0. 35 The assumption that X is a lattice is not innocuous when n > 1: For example, it holds when each xt describes the provision of a one-dimensional public good, but it need not hold if xt describes the allocation of a private good.
depends only on ϕ it θ t i and x it , and has strictly increasing differences in (ϕ it θ t i , x it ), while the principal's flow utility depends only on x t .
Then, if the problem of maximizing expected virtual surplus (13) has a solution, it has a solution χ such that, for all i = 1, . . . , n and
By inspection of the conditions in the proposition, guaranteeing strong monotonicity requires single-crossing and third-derivative assumptions familiar from static models. The new assumptions that go beyond them have to do with the behavior of the impulse response functions. When F-AUT and U-DSEP hold (i.e., when types evolve independently of the decisions and payoffs are separable in the decisions), expected virtual surplus (13) Note that the impulse response being nonincreasing tends to lead to monotonicity because it implies that distortions are weakly decreasing in types. For a novel setting that satisfies condition (ii), see Example 6 below.
Remark 7
We discuss in the supplementary material how Corollary 2 and Proposition 1 can be adapted to finding optimal mechanisms in some non-Markov environments. Note that the derivation of the expected virtual surplus (13) above makes no reference to Markov environments, and hence the difference is in verifying that the allocation rule maximizing it is indeed implementable.
Distortions
A first-best allocation rule maximizes the expected surplus E λ[χ] n i=0 U i (θ, χ(θ)) in our quasilinear environment. Similarly to static setting, a profit maximizing principal introduces distortions to the allocations to reduce the agents' expected information rents. When the participation constraints of the lowest initial types in (12) bind, the expected rent of agent i is given by
Thus the period-0 impulse response functions are an important determinant of the rent, and, by implication, of the distortions in optimal dynamic mechanisms. Given the various forms these functions may take, little can be said about the nature of these distortions in general. Indeed, we illustrate by means of a simple class of single-agent environments that the distortion in period t may be a nonmonotone function of the agent's types, or, for a fixed type sequence, a non-monotone function of the time period t. Example 5 also illustrates the use of ex-post monotonicity to verify implementability.
Example 5 (Nonlinear AR process) Consider a buyer-seller relationship, which lasts for T + 1 periods, with T ≤ ∞. The buyer's payoff takes the form U 1 (θ, x) = T t=0 δ t (a + θ t ) x t , with a ∈ R ++ and X t = [0,x] for somex >> 0. The seller's payoff is given by U 0 (θ,
2 . The buyer's type evolves according to the nonlinear AR process θ t = φ (θ t−1 ) + ε t , where φ is an increasing differentiable function, with φ (0) = 0, φ (1) < 1, and φ ≤ b for some 1 ≤ b < 1 δ , and where the shocks ε t are independent over time, with support [0, 1 − φ (1)]. By putting z t (θ t−1 , ε t ) = φ (θ t−1 )+ε t and using formula (4), we find the period-0 impulse responses
Since the type process is autonomous and decisions are separable across time (i.e., F-AUT and U-DSEP hold), the first-best allocation rule simply sets x t = a + θ t for all t ≥ 0 and θ t ∈ Θ t .
Furthermore, we can maximize expected virtual surplus (13) pointwise to find the allocation rule
We show in the supplementary material that if the hazard rate η 0 is nondecreasing, then χ is ex-post monotone, and thus it is an optimal allocation rule by Corollaries 1 and 2. Note that χ exhibits downward distortions since φ > 0. Increasing the period-τ type θ τ for 1 ≤ τ < t, reduces distortions in period t if φ is concave, but increases distortions if φ is convex. (Note that in the latter case, χ is not strongly monotone, yet it is PBE-implementable.) When φ is neither concave nor convex, the effect is non-monotone. Similarly, if φ (θ t−1 ) < 1, then the distortion in period t is smaller than that in period t − 1, whereas if φ (θ t−1 ) > 1, then the period-t distortion exceeds that in period t − 1.
Finally, note that the period-t allocation χ t (θ t ) is in general a non-trivial function of the buyer's types in all periods 0, . . . , t. This is in contrast to the special case of a linear function φ(θ t ) = γθ t , γ > 0, considered by Besanko (1985) , where the impulse response is the time-varying scalar I t = γ t as in Example 2, and where χ t (θ t ) depends only on the initial type θ 0 and the current type θ t .
The distortions in Example 5 are independent of the agent's current report. However, it is easy to construct examples where distortions are non-monotone also with respect to the current report:
Example 6 Consider the environment of Example 5, but assume now that T = 1 and that the buyer's type evolves as follows: The initial typeθ 0 is distributed uniformly on Θ 0 = [0, 1], whereas 
The allocation rule that solves the relaxed program is then given by
Because χ is strongly monotone, it is clearly implementable. By inspection, the second-period allocation is efficient at the extremes, i.e., for θ 1 ∈ {0, 1}, whereas all interior types are distorted downwards. Note that the no-distortions-at-the-bottom result is non-trivial, since even the lowest type here consumes a positive amount, so there would be room to distort downwards.
In the supplementary material, we use monotone comparative statics to give sufficient conditions for the allocation rule maximizing expected virtual surplus (13) to exhibit downward distortions as in the above examples. However, upward distortions can naturally arise in applications. This was first shown by Courty and Li (2000) , who provided a two-period example where the distribution of the agent's second-period type is ordered by his initial signal in the sense of a mean-preserving spread.
In consumption problems such as Example 5 and the one studied by Courty and Li (2000) , distortions can be understood purely in terms of the canonical impulse response (see Example 1)
.
If the kernels satisfy F-FOSD, then I t (θ t ) is positive leading to downward distortions as in Example 5.
If F-FOSD fails, then I t (θ t ) is negative at some θ t yielding upward distortions at that history as in Courty and Li (2000) . Dynamics can be seen similarly: As in Example 5, an increase in the impulse response increases distortions compared to the previous period, whereas a decrease leads to consumption being more efficient. In particular, if I t (θ t ) → 0, then consumption converges to the first best over time.
Bandit Auctions
To illustrate our results, we consider the problem of a profit-maximizing seller who must design a sequence of auctions to sell off, in each period t ≥ 0, an indivisible, non-storable good to a set of n ≥ 1 bidders who update their valuations upon consumption, i.e., upon winning the auction. This setting captures novel applications such as repeated sponsored search auctions where the advertisers privately learn about the profitability of clicks on their ads, or repeated procurement with learningby-doing. It provides a natural environment where the kernels depend on past allocations.
Let X it = {0, 1} for all i = 0, . . . , n and t ≥ 0, and define the set of feasible allocation sequences
n i=0 x it = 1 for all t ≥ 0}. The seller's payoff function is then given
x it c it , where c it ∈ R is the cost of allocating the object to bidder i (with c 0t normalized to 0). Each bidder i' payoff function takes the form
The type process of bidder i = 1, . . . , n is constructed as follows. , if
This formulation embodies the following key assumptions: (1) Bidders' valuations change only upon winning the auction (i.e., if x it = 0, then θ i,t+1 = θ it almost surely); (2) The valuation processes are time-homogenous (i.e., if bidder i wins the object in period t, then the distribution of his period-t + 1 valuation depends only on his period-t valuation and the total number of times he won in the past). 36 We start by verifying that the bandit auction environment defined above is regular and Markov.
Each bidder i's payoff function U i clearly satisfies Conditions U-D, U-ELC, and U-SPR since each X it is bounded. As for bidder i's type process, it satisfies the bounds in part (ii) of the Markov definition (and thus F-BE) by the uniform bound on the means of (R i (·|k)) k∈N . In order to verify F-BIR, we use the canonical representation of the process. That is, for all t > 0, ε it ∈ (0, 1), and
The Z functions then take the form . Since the impulse responses I i,(0),t are identical to 1 for all agents i and all periods t, the envelope formula (1) takes the form dV
, and the problem of maximizing expected virtual surplus (13) becomes
This is a standard multi-armed bandit problem: The safe arm corresponds to the seller and yields a sure payoff equal to 0; the risky arm i = 1, . . . , n corresponds to bidder i and yields a flow payoff
The solution takes the form of an index policy. That is, define the virtual index of bidder i = 1, . . . , n in period t ≥ 0 given history (θ
where T is a stopping time, andχ i is the allocation rule that assigns the object to bidder i in all periods. (Note that the virtual index depends on x t−1 i only through
.) The index of the seller is identically equal to zero and for convenience we write it as γ 0t (θ t 0 , x t−1 0 ) ≡ 0. The following virtual index policy then maximizes the expected virtual surplus: 37 For all i = 1, . . . , n, t ≥ 0, θ t ∈ Θ t , and x t−1 ∈ X t−1 , let J(θ t , x t−1 ) ≡ arg max j∈{0,...,n} γ jt (θ t j , x t−1 j ), and let
Proposition 2 (Optimal bandit auctions) Suppose that for all i = 1, . . . , n, the hazard rate η i0 (θ i0 ) is nondecreasing in θ i0 . Let χ, ψ be the choice rule where χ is the virtual index policy defined by (16) and where ψ is the transfer rule defined by (7) . Then χ, ψ is an optimal mechanism in the bandit auction environment.
The environment is regular and Markov, F-FOSD holds, and each U i is nondecreasing in θ i . Hence the result follows from Corollary 2 once we show that the virtual index policy χ satisfies integral monotonicity. We do this in the appendix by showing that χ satisfies average monotonicity defined in Corollary 1, which here requires that, for all i = 1, . . . , n, s ≥ 0, and (θ
is non-decreasing in his current bidθ is . Heuristically, this follows because a higher bid in period s increases the virtual index of arm i, which results in bidder i consuming sooner in the sense that, for any k ∈ N, the expected waiting time until he wins the auction for the kth time after period s is then weakly shorter. Note that because of learning, averaging is important: Even if increasing the current bid always makes bidder i to be more likely to win the auction today, for bad realizations of the resulting new valuation it leads to a lower chance of winning the auction in the future. However, by F-FOSD, higher current types are also more likely to win in the future on average.
It is instructive to compare the virtual index policy from the optimal bandit auction to the firstbest index policy that maximizes social surplus. The first-best policy is implementable by using the team mechanism of Athey and Segal (2012), or the dynamic pivot mechanism of Bergemann and Välimäki (2010) who consider a similar bandit setting as an application. In the first-best policy, bidder i's index at period-t history (θ
By inspection of (15) we see that the virtual index γ it (θ . 38 This implies that even ex ante symmetric bidders will in general be treated asymmetrically in the future, and hence the distortions in future periods reflect findings in optimal static auctions with asymmetric bidders. (For example, the firstbest and virtual indices will sometimes disagree on the ranking of any given bidders i and j, and hence i may win the object in some period t even if the first-best policy would award it to j.)
We conclude that the optimal mechanism for selling experience goods is essentially a dynamic auction with memory that grants preferential treatment based on the bidders' initial types. These features are markedly different from running a sequence of second-price auctions with a reserve price, and suggest potential advantages of building long-term contractual relationships in repeated procurement and sponsored search. class of allocation problems that generalize our bandit auction environment, and showed that the optimal mechanism is a virtual version of the dynamic pivot mechanism of Bergemann and Välimäki 38 Board (2007) and Eső and Szentes (2007) find similar optimal mechanisms in settings where the type processes are autonomous and there is only one good to be allocated.
(2010), the handicap mechanism being a special case. Postulating the model in terms of a state representation, they derived the allocation rule using our first-order approach, and established incentive compatibility in period 0 by verifying a condition analogous to our average monotonicity.
Kakade et al's proof of incentive compatibility for periods t > 0 differs from ours, and relies on the above observation about the optimal mechanism from period 1 onwards being an efficient mechanism for a fictitious environment where the seller's cost of assigning the object to bidder i is
, whereθ i0 is i's initial report. In particular, using an efficient mechanism for this fictitious environment that asks the bidders to re-report their initial types in period 1 gives the existence of a truthful continuation equilibrium from period 1 onwards. This approach requires, however, that every agent i's payoff and state representation be separable in the sense that there exist functions
While our bandit auction environment satisfies condition (i) by inspection of (14), neither condition is satisfied in non-linear environments such as our Example 5, for which our approach of verifying integral monotonicity in every period is applicable. On the other hand, Kakade et al can accommodate non-Markov environments that are separable in the above sense. Thus the approaches are best viewed as complementary.
Concluding Remarks
We have extended the standard Myersonian approach to mechanism design to dynamic quasilinear environments. In particular, our main results characterize local incentive compatibility constraints, provide a method of constructing transfers to satisfy them, address the uniqueness of these transfers, and characterize implementability of allocation rules in Markov environments. These results lend themselves to the design of optimal dynamic mechanism along the familiar lines of finding an allocation rule by maximizing expected (dynamic) virtual surplus, and then verifying that the allocation rule is implementable by checking an appropriate monotonicity condition.
The analysis presented above permits a unified view of the existing literature by identifying general principles and highlighting what drives similarities and differences in the special cases considered.
The generality of our model offers flexibility that facilitates novel applications, such as the design of sales mechanisms for the provision of new experience goods, or "bandit auctions."
The most important direction for future work pertains to the generality of our results on optimal dynamic mechanisms. In particular, our results were restricted to settings where the first-order approach yields an implementable allocation rule. To what extend this affects the qualitative findings about the properties of optimal mechanisms is an open question. For some progress in this direction, see Garrett and Pavan (2013) , who work directly with the integral monotonicity condition to show that, in the context of managerial compensation, the key properties of the contracts are unaffected.
A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1.
We start by establishing ICFOC i,0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Let the type processes be generated by the state representation E i , G i , z i n i=1 and consider a fictitious environment in which, in each period t ≥ 1, each agent i = 1, . . . , n observes the shock ε it and computes θ it = Z i,(0),t θ i0 , x t−1 i , ε t i . Consider a direct revelation mechanism in the fictitious environment in which each agent i reports θ i0 in period 0 and ε it in each period t ≥ 1, and which implements the decision ruleχ t θ 0 , ε t = χ t Z t (0) θ 0 ,χ t−1 θ 0 , ε t−1 , ε t and payment ruleψ t θ 0 , ε t =
, and
). Suppose that all agents other than i report truthfully in all periods. Agent i's payoff when the other agents' initial signals are θ −i,0 , agent i's true period-0 signal is θ i0 , his period-0 report isθ i0 , and all future shocks ε are reported truthfully is given bŷ
Since χ, ψ is PBIC in the original environment, truthful reporting by each agent at all truthful histories is a PBE of the mechanism χ,ψ in the fictitious environment. This implies that agent i cannot improve his expected payoff by misreporting his period-0 type and then reporting the subsequent shocks truthfully. That is, for any
The following lemma shows that the objective function W in the above maximization problem is well-behaved in the parameter θ i0 :
Lemma A.1 Suppose that the environment is regular. Then, for all i = 1, . . . , n andθ i0 ∈ Θ i0 , W i (θ i0 , ·) is equi-Lipschitz continuous and differentiable, with the derivative at θ i0 =θ i0 given by
Proof of Lemma A.1. Let us focus on those ε for which ∂Z i,(0),t (θ i0 ,χ
Conditions F-BE and F-BIR occurs with probability 1, and temporarily drop arguments ε, θ −i,0 ,θ i0 , x =χ(θ i0 , θ −i,0 , ε), and subscripts i, (0) to simplify notation.
The classical chain rule (using Conditions U-D and F-BIR) yields that, for any given T ,
uniformly in h since, using U-ELC, the difference is uniformly bounded by
and the right-hand side converges to zero as T → ∞ since C < ∞.
Also, the series in (17) converges uniformly in h by the Weierstrass M-test, since, using Conditions U-ELC and F-BIR,
Hence, we have
uniformly in h. By uniform convergence we interchange the order of limits and use (17) to get
This yields (putting back all the missing arguments)
Next, note that, being a composition of Lipschitz continuous functions,
the Dominated Convergence Theorem we can write
Hence, for anyθ i0 , W i θ i0 , · is differentiable and equi-Lipschitz in θ i0 with Lipschitz constant AE C i,(0) (ε) , and with derivative at θ i0 =θ i0 given by the formula in the lemma.
The equi-Lipschitz continuity of W i (θ i0 , ·) established in Lemma A.1 implies that the value function sup
W (θ i0 , θ i0 ), which coincides with the equilibrium payoff V χ,Ψ i (θ i0 ), is Lipschitz continuous. 39 Furthermore, by Theorem 1 of Milgrom and Segal (2002) , at any differentiability point of
. Using Lemma A.1, the Law of Iterated Expectations, and the definition of I i,(0),t in (2) then yields ICFOC i,0 . ICFOC i,s for s > 0 then follows by the same argument, since agent i's problem at a truthful period-s history is identical to the period-0 problem except for the indexing by the history.
Proof of Theorem 2.
For part (i), we show first that the flow transfers in (7) are welldefined by showing that the discounted sum (over t) of each of the three terms in ψ it has a finite expected net present value (NPV) under the measure λ i [χ, Γ]|θ s−1 , θ is for all i = 1, . . . , n, s ≥ 0, and 
where A i > 0 is the constant of equi-Lipschitz continuity of U i , and where B i > 0 is the bound on the impulse responses in Condition F-BIR. This means that
Hence, the expected NPV of the first term is finite by Condition F-BE and ||θ i || < ∞. For the second term, using (20) for t + 1 and the Law of Iterated Expectations, the expected NPV of its absolute value is bounded by
which is finite by Condition F-BE and ||θ i || < ∞. Finally, the expected NPV of the third term is finite by Conditions U-SPR and F-BE.
We then show that ICFOC i,s holds for all i and s. Rewrite the time-s equilibrium expected payoff given history (θ s−1 , θ is ) using Fubini's Theorem and the Law of Iterated Expectations as follows:
(The expectations of the other terms for t ≥ s cancel out by the Law of Iterated Expectations). The second line is independent of θ is , and the limit on the last line equals zero by (20) , Condition F-BE, and ||θ i || < ∞. By (6) is pinned down, up to a constant, by the allocation rule χ with probability 1.
Proof of Theorem 3. Given a choice rule χ, ψ and belief system Γ ∈ Γ(χ), for all i = 1, . . . , n, t ≥ 0, and (θ That is, Φ i (θ it ,θ it ) denotes agent i's expected payoff from reportingθ it at the period-t history i . We then letΦ i (θ it ) ≡ Φ i (θ it , θ it ) for all θ it ∈ Θ it denote the payoff from reporting truthfully in all periods s ≥ t.
Necessity: Fix i = 1, . . . , n and t ≥ 0. Suppose that the allocation rule χ ∈ X with belief system Γ ∈ Γ(χ) can be implemented in an on-path truthful PBE. Then there exists a transfer rule ψ such that the choice rule χ, ψ with belief system Γ is PBIC, and thus satisfies ICFOC i,t by Theorem 1.
This implies thatΦ i (·) satisfies condition (b) in Lemma 1 withΦ i (θ it ) = D χ,Γ it (θ t−1 , θ it ) for a.e. θ it .
Thus it remains to establish condition (a).
Lemma A.3 Suppose the environment is regular and Markov. Fix i = 1, . . . , n and t ≥ 0. If the choice rule χ, ψ with belief system Γ ∈ Γ(χ) satisfies ICFOC i,t+1 , then for allθ it ∈ Θ it , the choice rule χ •θ it , ψ •θ it with belief system Γ satisfies ICFOC i,t .
Proof of Lemma A.3. Note first that because the environment is Markov and χ, ψ with belief system Γ ∈ Γ(χ) satisfies ICFOC i,t+1 , the choice rule χ,ψ ≡ χ •θ it , ψ •θ it with belief system Γ clearly satisfies ICFOC i,t+1 because agent i's payoff does not depend on whether the previous period reportθ it has been truthful or not. In order to show that it also satisfies ICFOC i,t , we can use a (θ Φ i (θ it ,θ it ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ it with derivative given by D χ•θ it ,Γ it (θ t−1 , θ it ) for a.e. θ it . Hence, also condition (a) of Lemma 1 is satisfied. Since i and t were arbitrary, we conclude that the integral monotonicity condition (8) is a necessary condition for on-path truthful PBE implementability.
Sufficiency: Suppose the allocation rule χ ∈ X with belief system Γ ∈ Γ(χ) satisfies integral monotonicity. Define the transfer rule ψ by (7) . By Theorem 2, the choice rule χ, ψ with belief system Γ satisfies ICFOC. Thus the above arguments show that, for all i = 1, . . . , n, t ≥ 0, and any period-t history of agent i, the functions {Φ i (·,θ it )}θ it ∈Θ it andΦ i (·) satisfy conditions (a) and (b) of Lemma A.3. This implies that a one-step deviation from the strong truthtelling strategy is not profitable for agent i at any history in any period. The following version of the one-stage deviation principle then rules out multi-step deviations:
Lemma A.4 Suppose the environment is regular and Markov. Fix an allocation rule χ ∈ X with belief system Γ ∈ Γ(χ), and define the transfer rule ψ by (7) . If a one-stage deviation from strong truthtelling is not profitable at any information set, then arbitrary deviations from strong truthtelling
are not profitable at any information set.
The proof of this lemma consists of showing that despite payoffs being not a priori continuous at infinity, the bounds implied by U-SPR and part (ii) of the definition of Markov environments guarantee that under the transfers defined by (7), continuation utility is well-behaved. We relegate the argument to the supplementary material.
We conclude that integral monotonicity is a sufficient condition for the allocation rule χ ∈ X with belief system Γ ∈ Γ(χ) to be implementable in a strongly truthful PBE.
Proof of Proposition 1. Case (i): We construct a nondecreasing solution χ s (θ) sequentially for s = 0, 1, . . .. Suppose we have a solution χ in which χ s−1 (θ) is nondecreasing. Consider the problem of choosing the optimal continuation allocation rule in period s given type history θ s and allocation history χ s−1 θ s−1 . Using the state representation E i , G i , z i n i=1 from period s onward, we can write the continuation rule for t ≥ s as a collection of functionsχ t (ε) of the shocks ε.
First, note that, because X is a sublattice, t≥s X t is a lattice. This means that the set of feasible shock-contingent plansχ is also a lattice under pointwise meet and join operations (i.e., for each ε).
Next, note that, under the assumptions in the proposition, each agent i's virtual utility is supermodular in x ≥s and has increasing differences in θ s , x ≥s (note that Z s (θ s , ε) is nondecreasing in θ s by F-FOSD, and χ s−1 θ s−1 is nondecreasing in θ s−1 by construction). Therefore, summing over i and taking expectation over ε, we obtain that the expected virtual surplus starting with history θ s is supermodular in the continuation planχ and has increasing differences in (θ s ,χ).
Next, fix an arbitrary bidder i = 1, . . . , n and a state (θ 0 , ω) ∈ Θ 0 × (R n ) ∞ , and take a pair θ i0 , θ i0 ∈ Θ 0 with θ i0 > θ i0 . We show by induction on k that, for any k ∈ N, the kth time that i wins the object if he initially reports θ i0 (and reports truthfully in each period t > 0) comes weakly earlier than if he reports θ i0 . As the realization (θ 0 , ω) ∈ Θ 0 × (R n ) ∞ is arbitrary, this implies that the expected time to the k-th win is decreasing in the initial report, which in turn implies that the virtual policy χ satisfies average monotonicity.
As a preliminary observation, note that the period-t virtual index of bidder i is increasing in the (reported) period-0 type θ i0 since the handicap η −1 i0 (θ i0 ) is decreasing in θ i0 , and (in case t = 0) E λ[χ i ]|θ i0 [θ iτ ] is increasing in θ i0 for all τ ≥ 0.
Base case: Suppose, towards a contradiction, that the first win given initial report θ i0 comes in period t whereas it comes in period t > t given report θ i0 > θ i0 . As the realization (θ 0 , ω) is fixed, the virtual indices of bidders −i in period t are the same in both cases. But γ it ((θ i0 , θ i0 , . . . , θ i0 ), 0) > γ it ((θ i0 , θ i0 , . . . , θ i0 ), 0), implying that i must win in period t also with initial report θ i0 , which contradicts t > t .
Induction step: Suppose the claim is true for some k ≥ 1. Suppose towards contradiction that the (k + 1)th win given report θ i0 comes in period t whereas it comes in period t > t given θ i0 > θ i0 .
Then observe that (i) In both cases, i wins the auction k − 1 times prior to period t . Furthermore, since the realization (θ 0 , ω) is fixed, this implies that (ii) bidder i's current type θ it is the same in both cases, and (iii) the number of times each bidder j = i wins the object prior to period t is the same in both cases, and hence the virtual indices of bidders −i in period t are the same in both cases. By (i) and (ii) i's virtual index in period t is identical in both cases except for the initial report. That bidder i's period-t index is increasing in the initial report, along with (iii) implies that i must then win in period t also with initial report θ i0 , contradicting t > t . Hence the claim is true for k + 1.
